The Safety of Objects: Design and “Inverted Totalitarianism”


Does the ideology of design truly deliver on its promise of a democratization of aesthetics, or does it mire people more fixedly in the dreary procedures of consumerism?

Sunt lacrimae rerum. – Virgil

Recently I found opportunity to watch Objectified, a 2009 documentary by filmmaker Gary Hustwit, whose previous outing, Helvetica (2007), peeled back the many-layered mystery of that ubiquitous font style. (Who’d have thought Helvetica, or “Helvetty” as Hipster Runoff’s Carles calls it, would prove so revolutionary? Send words out sans serif and liberate nations!) Hustwit brings must the same sensibility to Objectified that he did to Helvetica, one which consists of extended montages while plinky-plonky indie rock drones on in accompaniment. ¶ I requested Objectified from Netflix because I thought it might offer some incisive critical commentary on design and designy things. I figured that any self-respecting documentarian wouldn’t put himself to the trouble of making a film if he lacked interest in closely scrutinizing his subject. What purpose do documentaries serve, after all, if not to present the sort of sustained and objective (admittedly a fraught term) treatment otherwise lacking in popular media generally? Documentaries ought to be a countervailing force against the marketing slogan, the sound bite. Objectified, unfortunately, does not live up to this expectation. It makes a pretense of objectivity, but mostly Objectified takes an uncritical, even loving, approach to its subject. Many feet of film (or perhaps megabytes of memory) are spent in lavish regard for design and the fingerprints it leaves all over both public and private space. In this respect, Objectified leaves one with the impression of its being more a visual love letter to designers and other luminaries of the creative class — many of whom appear in the film — than a documentary, properly speaking.

My experience viewing Objectified I can best describe as one of irritation shading into revulsion. The self-indulgence of leaving the camera trained on objects undergoing manufacture annoyed me, but I chalked it off to it being sort of cinematic Hamburger Helper — filler meant to extend what is really quite meager conceit. My annoyance turned to revulsion, however, precisely as a consequence of the attritive effect of these very scenes. In their frequency and duration, these scenes helped (quite unintentionally I’m sure) the film effect a sort of deconstructive jump in place: Certain implications quite other to the filmmaker’s design (pun intended) began to as it were peek through that which actually appeared on the screen. The effect of this rather reminded me of some ideas of the French theorist Pierre Macherey, who in his 1966 work For a Theory of Literary Production identifies two registers inhering in all literary discourse: the “spoken” and the “unspoken.” This is so because literary texts “say what they do not say,” an admittedly cryptic way of expressing the idea that the particular way of wording the literary representation of some subject is at the same time a suppression of other ways of wording, and thus, of representing, this same subject. The latter are banished to “the margins” of the literary text. The actual wording appearing on the page stands as simply one rendering among myriad possible others, yet one which becomes valorized (in the Marxian sense) simply by virtue of actually being  on the page. Criticism conducted in the spirit of Macherey, then, is an act of recuperation; the “spoken,” i. e., the literary representation appearing on the page, presents a point of entry through which the many marginalized other significations can be accessed in order to be brought dialectically to bear on the former — in order to produce what the French Marxist thinker (and uxorcide) Louis Althusser (who was Macherey’s teacher) calls a “symptomatic reading.” Read the rest of this entry »

The Uncommercial Traveler: A Review of Helen Rappaport’s Conspirator: Lenin in Exile


Conspirator: Lenin in Exile
by Helen Rappaport
Basic Books, 416 pp. ISBN: 978-0465013951

Late in his career, before he succumbed to a fatal illness, French poststructuralist historian and theorist Michel Foucault turned his scholarly attention to ethics. He found particularly interesting the idea, rooted in classical antiquity, of ascesis, a term related to today’s words ascetic and asceticism. This interest in ethics represents a surprising development in the general trajectory of Foucault’s previous inquiries. Foucault had long devoted himself to expelling humanistic biases from the theory and practice of writing history, even going so far as to declare, with Nietzsche-like flamboyance: “It is comforting … and a source of profound relief to think that man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, and that he will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form.” According to Foucault, “man” as a concept wandered onto the world-historical stage only late in the present act, and will likely at some future point disappear à la Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern in Shakespeare’s Hamlet — obscurely and with little fanfare, ado, or even remark. ¶ If Foucault proclaimed himself no fan of this arriviste concept “man,” what, then, could have possibly impelled his thought toward ethics, toward the particular issue of ascetic self-transformation? (Eric Paras takes up this very question in his 2006 book Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge, which, despite its regrettable title, offers ample — and refreshingly accessible — contextualization for Foucault’s Kehre) Indeed, Foucault’s ethical turn leads him to introduce some unwonted vocabulary into his writing: words like “spirituality” and “truth.” And to all appearances he uses them unironically.

Such a volte-face would surely discombobulate devotees of someone whose conception of history residual Frankfurt-Schoolman (and implacable critic of all things poststructuralist) Jürgen Habermas has characterized as a “chaotic multitude” and “an iceberg covered with the crystalline forms of arbitrary formations.” Foucault himself offered a clue as to what incited him to discourse on this unlikely later subject. “The idea of the bios [i.e., the human organism] as a material for an aesthetic piece of art is something that fascinates me,” he states in a 1983 interview:

The idea also that ethics can be a very strong structure of existence, without any relation with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure. All that is very interesting.

Foucault fastened onto the possibility of aesthetic self-fashioning with one’s very own organismic life as the expressive medium, and ethics as the technique of this expression. The fact that to Foucault’s thinking ethics can instantiate themselves independently — or, indeed, in defiance of — juridical norms, as well as authoritarian system or disciplinary structure to enforce these norms, argues for ethics primacy, and thus also for its strength as a structure for existence. Read the rest of this entry »

Obscured by Clouds: The Virtualized Ego and Online Sociality


Has the Internet Age delivered on the promise of egalitarian “netizenship,” or has it simply replaced old social constraints with new ones of a more pernicious, pervasive sort?

Networked sociality online once seemed to promise a democratized neo-public sphere in which real-world cultural disadvantages could be suppressed and meritorious ideas could get as much attention as they deserve. All the biases that come from the ways we are embedded in society — e.g., the ways our class background inadvertently shines through, the ways our given, unalterable identity is prejudged — could be suspended; and what we had to say could in a sense be presented as pure content, untainted by the form our identity would otherwise give to it. In his recent Eurozine essay, Geert Lovink evokes the days when technology enthusiasts dreamed of “netizens” who could mediate interpersonal problems in a virtual world in which inherited conflicts need not manifest themselves, a world where we are all already, in a manner of speaking, born again spiritually, purified of the dross of prejudice. The Internet was to be one ongoing ideal speech situation, and Web 2.0 was to provide the tools to make the revolution permanent.

But, as Lovink observes, “the old idea that the virtual is there to liberate you from your old self has collapsed.” Instead, our “real self” has become the thing we are encouraged to always try to communicate. We are starting to understand intuitively that no matter what we happen to be saying in a given instance, it’s ultimately about who we think we are. The idea that we would or could suspend our identities to partake in some disinterested discourse about the realm of ideas no longer seems credible. Read the rest of this entry »

Vagina Splendata: Beauty-Obsessed Women Exercise the “Pubic Option”


Do “vajazzling” and other faddish aesthetic enhancements promise to perfect the human form or to efface it?

EDWARD: Dazzle mine eyes, or do I see three suns? — William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part 3

I thought I had heard it all when I read an article this week on (yet another) Asian man’s marriage to an inanimate object. But then Wednesday delivered yet another instance of postmodern inanity. It looks like millions of bored American women have come up with yet another way to tinker with their bodies. According to a piece (with NSFW video) on the weblog Sociological Images, a new treatment called “vajazzling” is all the rage among the fairer sex, both young and old. Vajazzling refers to “the placing of a field of tiny crystals where your pubic hair would be,” the Sociological Images piece reports: “So, you essentially replace your pubic hair with shiny objects.” As silly as the treatment sounds, it’s in line with other forms of female body modification that have surfaced the past couple of decades. Labiaplasty especially has been in the news of late as thousands of woman feel pressured to resemble porn stars. And, though the whole body-modification trend can be passed off as the passing whim of a society grown decadent under late-stage capitalism, it does point to an increasing interest in melding the body with something more machine-like and artificial.

Certainly the desire to mate the human with the machine goes beyond the female desire to “look pretty”; it was seen as a means for accessing otherwise inaccessible truths about life. The Russian filmmaker Dziga Vertov frequently lauded the use of mechanical supplements to the human body. His films are paeans to the beautiful — and sometimes terrifying — supremacy of all things mechanical. Filmed in 1929, Man with a Movie Camera (video) does exactly this. It documents the intricacies of daily life in Odessa, Kiev and Moscow. Drifting clouds, speeding trains, women washing and dressing: such are the images that greet the viewer throughout the film. But these images are not presented to the viewer in a traditional manner — in a tidy narrative, complete with story arc. Rather, a host of experiments with lighting, montage, camera angle, fast or slow motion, freeze-frame, and flicker effect define the film. In presenting the viewer with images defined by a certain chaotic experimentation the film represents the world as seen through the camera’s eye, an eye that indiscriminately captures what the human eye cannot. In doing so the film appears to manifest undeniable truths. It cuts innumerable moments out of history’s vast flow, instantaneously freezing the passage of faceless millions rushing into an indeterminable future. A mechanical chronicler who captures the rushed intricacies of the modern cityscape is this “kino-eye.” “I am kino-eye, I am a mechanical eye. I, a machine, show you the world as only I can see it,” writes Vertov in “A Kino-Eye Discussion” (extract). Vertov saw the camera as a necessary supplement to the human eye; should one wish to capture the essence of life, one must seek out help from machines. Read the rest of this entry »

Dig a Phony: Identity, Consumerism and the “Jelly-Jar Problem”

Is it possible to live a fulfilling life without participating in and elaborating a consumerist code that according to countless social theorists serves to supply us with our sense of ourselves?

In the 1968 hippie exploitation film Psych-Out, Jack Nicholson plays Stoney, a San Francisco rock musician caught up in the competing forces of hedonism, commercialism, idealism and sentimentality. Stoney has uncomplicated desires: He wants to do his thing, play his music, earn a little bread, and get some lovin’ whenever and with whomever he can. Being part of the San Francisco hippie scene seems to grant his wishes while supplying a self-congratulatory veneer for his behavior — by pleasing himself, he can believe he is changing the world, is making a stand for personal freedom.

While “Rainy Day Mushroom Pillow” by the Strawberry Alarm Clock plays on the soundtrack, Stoney pays a visit to his curmudgeonly, AWOL band mate, Dave (Dean Stockwell), who apparently lives in a rooftop lean-to built against a giant billboard overlooking Haight Ashbury. Stoney wants to convince Dave to play a gig that might secure them a recording contract. Dave proceeds to challenge several of Stoney’s articles of faith (clip): free love is nothing but a choice, he contends; selling out is irrelevant to “feeling good”; the truth is a matter of what works;  common sense of the kick-a-stone variety refutes all forms of idealism. “All the games have to go, man,” Dave tells Stoney, “because it’s all one big plastic hassle.” To which Stoney retorts, “So live in a jelly jar?” Read the rest of this entry »

Running in Place: The Traveler’s Last Pose

“Supermodernity” fulfills the implicit promise of the internet. Once we are everywhere and nowhere at once, fully uploaded, fully contained, there will be no place left to go.

Is there any place where we can get away from ourselves? The insistent therapeutic command to find ourselves seems to have led to a surfeit of identity, to an oppressive self-consciousness that consists mainly of an awareness that we are fundamentally threatened with the danger of being misrecognized, of being misconstrued as someone we are not.

Once upon a time, we needed to travel to escape the way our identity was inscribed in the spaces we passed through on ordinary days — the knowledge the neighborhood or small town had of us, as well as the knowledge we needed to navigate it, and all the facts about ourselves the intersection of those two bodies of knowledge revealed. The inescapable facts of our personal history — class, family background, race, nationality, that sort of thing — came back to us in the ways we found ourselves dealing with local conditions. Read the rest of this entry »

Pataphysical Graffiti: Facebook and Privacy’s End

The nonsensical excesses of pataphysics one can now find in the very warp and weft of the social fabric, while pataphysics itself, appropriately enough, has sailed far out of sight of the shore of the normative values it once critiqued.

Zuckerberg Tyrannos: The improbable, baby-faced founder of Facebook — whose first name, for those who have been living in a cave (or, at least without Facebook) the past several years, is Mark — recently announced the death of individual privacy, dismissing it as a “social norm” from which the wider wired world has evolve away. Apparently now only a hoary fetish for Enlightenment political philosophers, privacy has exited with nary a tear nor lament. Today’s human, homo ostentatius, is a fundamentally different creature from her eighteenth-, nineteenth- or even twentieth-century antecedents. Or so saith Zuckerberg.”People have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and different kinds, but more openly and with more people.”

Zuckerberg’s generalization strikes one as rather sweeping. Several people of my acquaintance profess themselves not at all comfortable with the — shall I say demographic nudity? — which Facebook demands of its participants. These friends of mine not only have a problem with sharing information of any kind, but also have deep philosophical reservations about those who share this information “more openly and with more people.” Admittedly, these friends occupy (along with me) a sociocultural periphery, one occupied by those who would  prove reluctant joiners to any new fad. I can’t help thinking, however, that my friends and I simply represent a contingent afflicted with a particularly acute case of self-consciousness that is more or less present in everyone, a backwardness when it comes to publicizing oneself, particularly in the manner which Facebook encourages: the revelation of personal details. Some details might be boring, others embarrassing; Facebook doesn’t discriminate. It welcomes them all. Read the rest of this entry »

Me TV: Let a Thousand Broadcasters Bloom

The networked information economy reinforces the idea that we are all individual, atomized owners of our own mini-means of production. We thereby become bite-sized capitalists, manufacturing our own identity as our flagship product, and supporting the social order that relies on such subjectivity.

In the teleology of traditional Marxism, the working class was to become so immiserated by exploitation and exclusion that it would inevitably throw off its chains, expropriate the expropriators, and establish a new egalitarian social order based on the end of alienation and the maximum fulfillment of humanity’s capabilities as as species. But along the way, in the 20th century, something happened. The bondage of capitalist relations seemed to cease to be so chafing. Instead of ever-increasing misery, consumerism appeared to unleash desire and the potential for elaborate individual gratification hitherto undreamed of.

The proletariat may not have liberated itself as a class, but the course of industrialization offered them unprecedented opportunity to differentiate themselves as individuals.

This obviously presented a problem for Marxist theory. What if the working class didn’t want to be free? In One-Dimensional Man, Frankfurt School philosopher Herbert Marcuse characterized the situation he observed in 1964 this way: “Society takes care of the need for liberation by satisfying the needs which make servitude palatable and perhaps even unnoticeable, and it accomplishes this fact in the process of production itself.” The technological changes in the field of production that were supposed to give workers the tools to liberate themselves instead, in Marcuse’s view, gave capitalists new ways to mask the proletariat’s unfreedom. Read the rest of this entry »

Building the Mystery: Social Media as Collective Epic

Social media like Facebook and Twitter have become much more than communication devices. They have become the very means by which people secure an effective ontology. “I tweet, therefore I am.”

October, a journal of art criticism, devoted its Fall 2006 issue to the life and work of Sergei Tret’iakov, a 20th-century Russian playwright and associate of such cultural luminaries as Vladimir Mayakovsky and Sergei Eisenstein. Tret’iakov aligned himself with the Constructivist movement, an outgrowth of Futurism that came to dominate the art of the young Soviet Union before giving way to socialist realism in the 1930s. Futurists and Constructivists alike reacted to the impressionism and expressionism that reigned during the late nineteenth century, and thus they dedicated themselves to scraping away these movements’ vestiges.

Tret’iakov’s contemporary, the artist, designer, and eventual Soviet cultural commissar Alexei Gan, offers this programmatic formulation of Constructivism, which emphasizes how thoroughly it embodies the spirit of the Communist revolution, as well as the workers’ paradise to emerge from it. He writes,

Construction must be understood as the coordinating function of Constructivism.

If the tectonic unites the ideological and formal, and as a result gives a unity of conception, and the faktura is the condition of the material, then the construction discovers the actual process of putting together.

Thus we have the “third discipline,” the discipline of the formation of conception through the use of worked material.

All hail to the Communist expression of material building!

The resulting artwork or “construction” fuses the “ideological,” “formal” and “material,” giving rise to “the third discipline,” so called by Gan, which pretends to completeness, the three elements reflecting each other harmoniously. One cannot deny the attraction of an art that so serenely synthesizes such seemingly disparate elements of existence. Others had made a similar effort before the Constructivists, most notably the nineteenth-century German composer Richard Wagner, whose idea of the “total art work” (Gesamtkunstwerk) set the standard for Wagner’s own compositions. Of course, history records what this idea of Wagner’s eventually led to — fascism. Read the rest of this entry »

Confessio Fraternitatis: Twitter as Spiritual Exercise

The fact that consumerism assimilates resistance in order to move merchandise makes consumerism difficult to resist. Something similar is happening with social media: We are left twittering our paranoia about what Twitter is doing to us.

You can’t be what you were. The technological changes that allow you to read this (and us to publish it) have foisted upon us a new conception of identity, one more thoroughly suited to consumerism. In particular, what began as a new-found ability to broadcast what we consume culturally and to be recognized (if not paid) for consuming well are becoming compulsions. No one any longer presumes identity to be an essence we are born with and discover; such an idea is the preferred illusion of the modern era. Rather, the newfangled notion of identity is as capital stock that we are compelled to expand roughly along the same line as that of the logic which Marx argued drove capitalists to accumulate! accumulate!

Michel Foucault’s lectures “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self” (reprinted in Political Theory in 1993) has some bearing on this. In these lectures, he begins to explain his move away from his preoccupation with power toward what is usually referred to as governmentality. Read the rest of this entry »